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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
The purpose of this appeal is an attempt to reverse an award
by the District Court of visitation of five grandchildren with
their paternal grandparents.

This Court has jurisdiction over

this case under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3-(2)(i),
specifically providing for appellate jurisdiction in the Court of
Appeals in appeals over visitation issues,

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellees do not disagree materially with Appellants
Statement of Issues and applicable standards of review.
Appellees wish to present one additional issue:
attorney fees.

That of

The standard of review for this issue is governed

by Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 33, providing for the award
of attorney fees in a frivolous appeal.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
The interpretation of Utah Code Annotated Section 30-5-2 is
determinative of this case.

Utah Code Annotated Section 30-5-2

reads:
"30-5-2

Visitation rights of grandparents and other
immediate family members.

"(1) The district court may grant grandparents and
other immediate family members reasonable rights of
visitation if it is in the best interests of the children."

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action by Boyd and Beverly brought under Utah
Code Annotated Section 30-5-2 to have a court order issued
granting them more liberal visitation with their grandchildren.
The issue was first heard by Commissioner Michael G.
Alllphin on an Order to Show Cause for temporary visitation by
Boyd and Beverly Campbell pending final disposition of the case.
At this hearing held on March 18, 1993, the Commissioner granted
temporary visitation, and defined the schedule for said
visitation as (1) every other Saturday from 9:00 a.m. until
Sunday in time for the children to attend church in their home
LDS Ward, (2) reasonable telephone contact, (3) if this schedule
interfered with any school or church activities or medical
appointments, the child involved would not attend the visitation.
Janet objected to the Commissioner's order pursuant to Utah Code
of Judicial Administration 6-401.

A hearing on this objection

was heard by Judge Gordon J. Low on May 19, 1993. At this
hearing, the parties entered into a Stipulation allowing Boyd and
Beverly visitation essentially one day at some time every other
week, and required that Boyd and Beverly make arrangements for
this visitation by phoning Janet on Sunday or Monday of that
week.

After this Stipulation expired, the parties agreed to

basically the same arrangement until the time of the hearing,
which was held on September 17, 1993. At this hearing, evidence
was proffered and arguments made.

The testimony proffered and

arguments made addressed the issues of the effect of the
2

visitation on the parent-child relationship (Janet and her
children), and each party's desires regarding how that visitation
ought to take place.

Judge Gordon J. Low made a bench ruling

giving Boyd and Beverly Campbell visitation according to a
portion of the terms they requested in the Requested Visitation
Schedule submitted by them at this hearing.
This bench ruling was reduced to a written Order on October
27, 1993.

This order disposes of the only issue in the case, and

is the final judgment of the Court.

It is from that Order that

Boyd and Beverly appeal to this court.

RELEVANT FACTS
Boyd and Beverly Campbell are the parents of Kelly Campbell.
Kelly and Janet were husband and wife until his untimely death on
August 1, 1991. Kelly and Janet have four children, Marc,
Brennen, Wade, and Lorrin, and Janet was pregnant with a fifth
child, Tannen, when Kelly was killed in a sky-diving accident.
(R. p. 2, paragraphs 4, 5, and 6) When Kelly was alive, Boyd and
Beverly did not enjoy a healthy and frequent family relationship
with each other, contrary to Boyd and Beverly's Statement of
Facts.

(T. p. 25, lines 1-13)

After Kelly's death, Janet attempted to maintain the
relationship between her children and Boyd and Beverly.

However,

Boyd and Beverly's requests became more demanding and less
considerate of Janet and the children's schedules and
preferences.

(T. p. 19 lines 7-24)
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The Complaint filed in this case requests visitation that is
very close to a schedule of visitation that would be awarded to a
non-custodial parent.

The Complaint requests visitation the

second and fourth weekends of each month from 8:00 p.m., Friday,
to 6:00 p.m., Sunday; some time during the school holidays such
as Thanksgiving, Christmas, spring vacation and Memorial Day;
some time with each child either the day before or the day after
his birthday; and three weeks of summer visitation.
A Motion for Order to Show Cause was also filed with Boyd
and Beverly's Complaint.

An Order to Show Cause was issued and a

hearing on this Order was heard by Commissioner Michael G.
Allphin on March 18, 1993.

(R. 15)

Janet was represented by

Attorney Jack J. Molgard at that hearing.

(R. 23) Commissioner

Allphin entered an Order allowing Boyd and Beverly temporary
visitation and defined the schedule for that temporary visitation
as follows:

(1) every other Saturday from 9:00 a.m. until Sunday

in time for the children to attend church in their home LDS Ward,
(2) reasonable telephone contact, (3) if this schedule interfered
with any school or church activities or medical appointments, the
child involved would not attend the visitation.
Janet objected to this Temporary Order.

(R. 23 and 24)

(R. 28) At this

point, Jack J. Molgard withdrew as Janet's attorney, and Dianne
R. Balmain entered her appearance as Janet's counsel.

(R. 33 and

34)
Although no answer was filed to Plaintiff's Complaint, no
default was ever taken, and the matter proceded as though an
4

Answer had been filed denying all allegations contained there.
Additionally, counsel for Janet recalls that it was Judge Low who
brought up the fact that no answer had been filed in the inchambers conference with counsel following their arguments and
proffers of evidence at the September 17, 1993 hearing.
On March 18, 1993, a hearing on Janet's Objection to the
Commissioner's Temporary Order was held before the Honorable
Gordon J. Low.

At this hearing, the parties entered into a

Stipulation which essentially allowed Boyd and Beverly to
exercise visitation for one day every other week by making
arrangements through Janet on Sunday or Monday of that week.
37-38)

(R.

This arrangement continued until the hearing on September

17, 1993.
On September 17, 1993, a review hearing was held before the
Honorable Gordon J. Low.
23.

(R. p. 74, T. p. 2, lines 4-7 and 19-

It was the intent of both parties that the Court's ruling in

that hearing would effect a total resolution of all of the issues
of the case.

(T. p. 2, lines 24-25, p. 3, lines 1-3)

Counsel for both parties felt that the presentation of
evidence through testimony would further exacerbate the already
strained relations of the parties.

Thus counsel proffered their

evidence and then presented arguments to the Court.

(T. p. 3,

lines 4-13)
At this hearing, Boyd and Beverly presented a Requested
Visitation Schedule to the Court.

5

(R. p. 72 and 73) A copy of

this Requested Visitation Schedule is attached to the Addendum
marked as Exhibit "A".
At the conclusion of counsels' proffers and argument, the
Court held an off-the-record hearing with both counsel in
Chambers.

(T. 26, lines 20-23)

Then the Court interviewed two

of the grandchildren off the record in Chambers.

(T. p. 27,

lines 1-3)
At the request of Boyd and Beverly's counsel, the Court then
reiterated much of its discussion with counsel in chambers.
p. 27 lines 12-13)

(T.

The Court stated that it believed that

healthy family relationships, and extended family relationships
are a basis of our societal relationships, and that public policy
encourages the facilitation of these relationships.
lines 15-21)

(T. p. 27,

The Court then stated that it had some strong

concerns regarding the constitutionality of the statute at issue,
as it may allow an eroding or compromising of the parental
authority in relationship with the children, and that this
relationship is not just constitution, but fundamental.
27, lines 21-25, p. 28 lines 1-3)

(T. p.

The Court explained that the

right of a parent to have discretion relative to the raising of a
child is quite fundamental and should be invaded only when a
parent is found to be absolutely unfit and the parent's influence
on the children expose the children to unreasonable danger.
p. 28, lines 12-18)

(T.

The Court explained that parents have great

discretion in the raising of their children, but also have great
responsibility.

(T. p. 29 lines 16-19)
6

The Court further explained that the relationship of
grandchildren and grandparents is influenced in large measure by
the relationship of the parents and grandparents, and that the
statute at issue was ont meant to provide to grandparents a
vested right of visitation.
lines 7-9)

(T. p. 29 lines 11-15, and p. 30,

The Court found that the grandparents have to defer

to the parents almost exclusively, and the fact that the father
of these children is deceased does not change that finding.
page 31, lines 2-5)

(T.

The Court then issued a bench ruling which

Attorney Balmain was directed to reduce to writing.

The Court

signed this Order on October 27, 1993, after it was submitted but
never signed approved as to form by Attorney Hoggan.

(R. 79-82)

A copy of the Order from which Boyd and Beverly appeal is
attached to the Addendum and marked as Exhibit "B".
The Court's September 17, 1993 Order granted Boyd and
Beverly the following visitation schedule:
2. One (1) evening on the day before or after each
child's birthday from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. if the birthday
occurs during the school year, and until 8:30 p.m. if the
birthday occurs when school is not in session.
3.

One (1) day during the Christmas holidays.

4.

One-half (1/2) day during the Thanksgiving holiday.

5. The time and duration of the Campbell family
reunion, provided that the Defendant/Mother is also invited
to attend.
6. Once per month from 4:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m. with
one child of the Plaintiffs' choice for purposes of
development of a one-on-relationship with that child.

7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Constitutionality of the statute 30-5-2 was properly
before the Court for adjudication, as after the parties'
stipulations, only legal issues remained for the Court to decide.
Janet stipulated that some visitation of Boyd and Beverly with
the children was in the children's best interests, thereby
removing the major factual issue from the case.

Further, Janet

stipulated to a schedule for some visitation to take place,
thereby removing the remaining issue.

Had the trial court ruled

on the legal issues before taking the parties' stipulations,
there would have remained no factual issues to be decided.

The

determination of legal issues is precisely the function of the
trial court, which function it properly fulfilled in this case.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 30-5-2 WAS
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT FOR ADJUDICATION.
The Complaint in this case is based on Utah Code Annotated
Section 30-5-2, which states:
"30-5-2 Visitation rights of grandparents and other immediate
family members.
"(1) The district court may grant grandparents and
other immediate family members reasonable rights of
visitation if it is in the best interests of the children."
Janet does not dispute the fact that the Constitutionality
of this provision was never raised by either party or their
counsel, but was raised by the Court sua sponte.
8

No state

statute or legal principle prohibits any trial court from raising
a legal or factual issue in this manner•
Appellants seem to assert that because the issue here is
visitation rather than custody, constitutional concerns should
never have come into play.

However, when a the rights as a

parent are impinged upon through a court order requiring that she
allow another person to become involved in her children's lives,
a constitutional issue is raised.
held.

Other state courts have so

See, Hawk v.Hawk, No. 03S01-9201-CV-00013, Tennessee

Supreme Court (1993); Shriver v. Shriver, (1966) 7 Ohio App. 2d
169, 36 Ohio Ops 2d 308, 219 NE2d 300; See also,

90 A.L.R. 3rd

222, Grandparent Visitation Rights

A.

THE COURT APPLIED THE PROPER STANDARD TO BOYD AND
BEVERLY CAMPBELL'S ACTION FOR VISITATION RIGHTS WITH
THEIR GRANDCHILDREN.

Boyd and Beverly argue that the trial court applied an
incorrect standard in that it ordered what the parent would agree
to by way of visitation, and not what visitation order was in the
best interests of the children.
However, the trial court specifically states that it finds
that "visitation with these grandparents and the grandchildren is
beneficial and in the best interest and welfare of the children
and therefore should be granted."

(T. page 30, lines 12-16)

Further, the Court ordered the specific visitation that was
agreed to by the parent, Janet, in this case, as a matter of
confirming the stipulation.

It should be noted that Janet agreed
9

that some form of visitation is in the best interests of the
children.

(T. p. 3f lines 21-25, and p. 19, lines 5-7)

It could

be said that Janet stipulated to the fact that visitation of some
form was in the best interest of the children, but had some
dispute regarding the specifics of how that visitation was
carried out.
Boyd and Beverly also seem to argue that they did not enter
into any stipulation regarding their requested visitation
schedule.

They seem to argue that if they could not be awarded

the entire schedule they requested, they would not stipulate to
any part of it.

The reasonableness of this position in this type

of litigation, where precious relationships with children are at
issue seems highly inappropriate.
The case cited by Boyd and Beverly, Ehrlich v. Ressner
(1977) 55 App. Div. 2nd 953, 391 NYS 2d 152, is particularly
instructive in this case where a trial judge's denial of a
maternal grandfather's petition to secure visitation rights was
reversed.

The facts are somewhat similar in that one of the

grandchildren's parents being deceased.

The Court in that case

also had an off-the-record discussion with the children. Here,
the Court had an off-the-record discussion with two of the
children, now ages 12 and 10. There, the children were all teenaged, and likely more able to articular their desires.
Boyd and Beverly would have this Court believe that the case
is exactly similar.

However, here the trial court did not base

its decision on its off-the-record discussion with the children.
10

The trial judge merely pointed out that he found the discussions
"very informative."

(T. p. 27, line 3, page 32, lines 2-16)

He

further pointed out that the children "had not been coached" nor
directed to what they should tell him.

(T. p. 32, lines 5-16)

It is noteworthy that the children here did not say that they
were "busy" and "did not want to feel compelled to maintain any
specific visitation" as was the case in Ehrlich.
The statute in issue in the Ehrlich case provided for the
specific situation here, where a parent of a minor children is
deceased, which circumstance our statute does not specifically
provide for.

However, the two statutes are similar in that each

provides for the court to secure visitation privileges "as the
best interests of the child may require".

Ehrlich

The fact that our statute does not provide for the specific
situation of one deceased parent cannot go unnoticed.

Basic

rules of statutory interpretation would require that we not make
a special rule for the situation of the death of one parent,
where the legislature has seen fit to cover all situations with
one rule, and has stated that we should be guided by the best
interests of the children.

It would appear that the legislature

has considered the concept engendered by the New York statute,
which is that the parents of the deceased parent to the children
at issue essentially take the place of that parent with regard to
a visitation schedule, and found that this option did not serve
the interests of the people of the State of Utah.

11

The Court in Ehrlich stated that "by having enacted this
statute, the legislature implicitly recognized that visits with
grandparents are often a precious part of a child's experience,"
The Court further stated that "although control over visitation
rests within the sound discretion of a trial judge, the judge
must be guided by the humanitarian purposes of the statute and by
an independent evaluation of the best interest of the children."
Judge Low nearly duplicated this language in his statement
to parties and counsel when he said "I think there's nothing
better than a wonderful, warm, healthy family relationship
between grandparents and grandchildren; in fact, extended family.
I think it's a basis of our societal relationships and I think
it's wonderful and healthy and ought to be encouraged and I think
public policy does."

(T. p. 27 lines 15-21)

Further, the Court

heard proffers of evidence from both counsel regarding the
effects of visitation on the children.

The trial court also held

an off-the-record discussion with two of the children involved.
The parties essentially stipulated that some visitation
would be in the best interests of the children, as the Court's
first question to counsel for Janet reflects.
17-25)

The Court also specifically found.

(T. p. 3, lines

(T. p. 30, lines 12-

18)
B.

THE COURT'S VIEWS ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THIS
STATUTE DID NOT COLOR ITS DECISION IN THIS MATTER.

The Court's views regarding the Constitutionality of the
statute did not color its decision in this matter.

Since Janet

essentially stipulated the fact that some visitation of Boyd and
12

Beverly with the children would be in their best interests, and
then stipulated to a schedule for such visitation, the fact that
the Court felt that the statute was unconstitutional became a
moot point.

The only possible effect the Court's view of the

Constitutionality of the statute could have had would have been
that Boyd and Beverly would have been granted no visitation
whatsoever.
Further, the issue of bias or prejudice in the trial court,
or any matter not put in issue before the trial court, may not be
raised for the first time on appeal.

James v. Preston, 746 P.2d

799, 801 (Utah App. 1987) Appellants seem to be asking for a new
judge, one without the bias on the Constitutionality of this
statute, on remand.

To do so, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,

Rule 63(b) requires that they have first filed an affidavit in
the trial court.

They have not complied with this requirement,

and are raising the issue for the first time on appeal.

POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN THE BASIS FOR
ITS DECISION.
Utah Code Annotated provides for grandparent visitation when
the district court finds that it is in "the best interest of the
children."

Boyd and Beverly argue that the trial Court "never

did find that visitation would not be in the best interest of the
children."

Appellant's Brief, page 13

The Court's findings, as

memorialized by counsel for Janet, do state specifically:

13

1. Some visitation of the children by the Plaintiffs
will be beneficial and in the best interests and well-being
of the children," Order, R. p. 79-82, emphasis added
(attached hereto as Exhibit "B") See also, T. p.
Boyd and Beverly argue that the Court's findings in this
case do not meet the standards required by the Utah Supreme Court
and the Utah Court of Appeals, because the findings do not
provide adequate facts and data for the Court of Appeals to find
the that the trial court's decision was rationally based.
v, Sukin, 842 P.2d 922 Utah App. 1992

Sukin

They also argue that the

trial courts findings are also inadequate because they do not
provide "a logical and legal basis for the ultimate conclusions."
Milne Truck Lines v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 1373
(Utah 1986)

A simple review of the trial court's findings shows

that they are rational and logical, one following from another,
explaining the basis for the Court's determination that the
statute was not Constitutional:

The parent-child relationship is

the primary relationship to be enhanced, therefore the
grandparents must defer to the parent.

The children have

suffered as a result of the fact that this has not happened and
this litigation has taken place.

(R. 79-82)

The Court goes

through this analysis forwards and then backwards, in an effort
to explain the basis for its decision to all the parties
involved.

The Court's legal reasoning was provided in step-by-

step fashion.
Boyd and Beverly argue that the findings are not
sufficiently detailed and do not include enough subsidiary facts
14

to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each
factual issue is based."
1986)

Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423 (Utah

Janet essentially stipulated that some visitation with

Boyd and Beverly was in the children's best interests, thus
removing the major issue from the case.

The particular facts

surrounding how that visitation should take place were then the
only remaining issue.
visitation.

Janet further stipulated to some

These two stipulations removed any factual issue

from the purview of the Court.
was legal.

The only remaining issue then,

The Court very adequately explained the basis for its

legal decision.
Boyd and Beverly argue that the findings of fact "are not
findings of fact at all." Appellant's Brief, page 17

"There is

no finding of fact by the Court to lead to its conclusions other
than the fact that Janet agreed to some visitation...."

The

Court did base its decision on its finding that visitation was in
the best interests of the children, to which fact and finding
Janet also stipulated.

It is conceivable that the Court could

have ordered that no visitation take place, had Janet not
stipulated to any.

However, as argued above, there is no rule

prohibiting a trial court from raising an issue sua sponte.
Boyd and Beverly allege that "Finding No. 1 does not
articulate why or what visitation will be in the best interest
and well-being of the children."

Janet stipulated to this fact,

therefore the Court need not make any specific findings thereon.
Further, the trial court did explain the basis for its decision
15

that generally extended family relationships are to be encouraged
and fostered.

(T. p. 27, lines 18-21)

Boyd and Beverly also argue that "Finding No. 2 is not a
finding of fact at all, but rather a conclusion of law that a
constitutional right of Defendant/Mother is impinged upon by
Section 30-5-2.

The purported finding does not articulate how or

in what way, in the context of this case, a constitutional and
fundamental right of Defendant/Mother is impinged upon or even
what that 'constitutional and fundamental' right to be protected
against the claims of Boyd and Beverly may be."

The Court in its

bench ruling did, however, state that "the right of a parent to
have discretion relative to the raising of a child is about as
fundamental a right as we can find."

(T. p. 28, lines 12-14)

Appellants state that "Finding No. 3 is not a finding of
fact either, but rather is a vague preachment of a parent's legal
responsibility.

It does not articulate any fact from which the

Court could conclude in this case that visitation with the
grandchildren was not in the grandchildren's best interest."
Finding No. 3 does state the logical basis for the Court's
conclusion that the statute impinges upon a Constitutional right.
Boyd and Beverly argue that "Finding No. 8 finds that Janet
stipulated to the visitation granted by the Court.

It does not

find Bovd and Beverly stipulated to the same visitation."

This

argument seems to imply that if Boyd and Beverly couldn't have
the entire schedule they requested in their "Requested Visitation
Schedule", they did not want or would not take anything at all.
16

The issue before the trial court was would grandparent
visitation be in the best interests of the grandchildren and, if
so, to what extent.

The Court's findings here state that "some

visitation would be in the best interests...of the children."
(T. p. 3, lines 14-22).

As to some of Boyd and Beverly's

specific requests, the Court specifically found those not to be
in the best interests of the children.

For example, the Court

stated that it would not order weekend visitation because it did
not find it to be in the best interest and welfare of the
children.

(T. p. 33, lines 8-10)

See also,

T. p. 34, lines 10-

17, p. 35, lines 5-9)
A.

GRANDPARENT VISITATION IN THIS CASE HAS NOT BEEN
"VIRTUALLY PROHIBITED".

Boyd and Beverly assert that "[t]he visitation Order limits
the time Boyd and Beverly can have visitation with all of the
grandchildren at the same time to one day during the Christmas
holiday, one-half day during the Thanksgiving holiday, and the
Campbell family reunion if Janet is invited.
two and one-half (2-1/2) days per year."

This is a total of

Boyd and Beverly assert

that this limitation is "wholly unreasonable" and gives them
"virtually no time to visit with all of the grandchildren at the
same time and establish family rapport."

At no time has Janet

argued that her children ought not develop a healthy and warm
relationship with their paternal grandparents.

However, the

proctocolitis of the situation dictate that a predetermined
schedule allowing visitation with all five (5) children, ranging
in age from two (2) to twelve (12) is nearly impossible.
17

These

are boys who are each involved in various combinations of the
following activities:

Scouting, piano lessons, soccer, Little

League, and 4-H (horses), in addition to school and church
activities as well as various household responsibilities.
Janet has wisely determined that the opportunities afforded
through these activities for educational, social and emotional
growth are important to the children's well-being.

This clash

between the children's activity schedule as determined by their
remaining living parent and the desires of their paternal
grandparents is exactly the place that Constitutional
considerations emerge.

The trial court stated that the primary

relationship with which public policy is concerned is the parentchild relationship.

(T. p. 36, lines 3-13)

Where the

grandparent-grandchild relationship begins to interfere with this
relationship, a parent's Constitutional rights are raised.
Further, Boyd and Beverly argue that "those portions of the
Order allowing visitation only with one child at a time may well
have the effect of dividing the children in their relationship
with Boyd and Beverly."

However, this portion of the Order was

taken directly from Boyd and Beverly's Requested Visitation
Schedule, item 8, attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
Prior to Kelly's death, the children visited with Boyd and
Beverly approximately once per month, usually as a family, with
the exception of the time on extended vacations that Boyd and
Beverly spent. Were it not for the strained relations engendered
by this litigation, it is possible that this schedule may have
18

continued.

(T. page 25, lines 3-7)

It is also important to note

that these children have another set of grandparents, Janet's
parents, with whom they also need time to develop a relationship.
The statute also allows other immediate family members to
petition the district court for visitation.
Annotated Section 30-5-2.

See, Utah Code

These children have six maternal aunts

and one paternal uncle and one paternal aunt, in addition to
spouses of these aunts and uncle and cousins.
If Boyd and Beverly were awarded their Requested Visitation
Schedule, many of the other relatives would also be required to
petition the Court to get their fair time with the children.

It

is obvious that Janet must have the discretion to control the
children's activities and involvements so that she is afforded
the opportunity of exercising her full rights and duties as the
childrens' parent.
The scheduled requested by Boyd and Beverly is not
altogether different from that given by the legislature in
Section 30-3-5 of the Utah Code, defining Minimum Guidelines for
Visitation.

Boyd and Beverly's Requested Schedule asks for time

around major holidays, significant time in the summer, birthdays
and alternating weekends.

The inappropriateness of this much

time is obvious when one considers that their relationship to the
children is one of grandparents rather than parents.

POINT THREE.
JANET SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES IN RESPONDING TO THIS
APPEAL.
19

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-56, in any
civil action the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to
a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or
defense was without merit and not brought or asserted in good
faith.

Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33 further states

"if the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under
these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just
damages, which may include single or double costs and/or
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party,"
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33 defines "frivolous
appeal" as "one not grounded in fact, nor warranted by existing
law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify or
reverse existing law."

Janet would argue that Boyd and Beverly's

appeal is frivolous for the reason that they did receive the
relief they requested at the trial court level: Visitation with
their grandchildren.

Further, they were receiving this even

before their court action.

Janet had stipulated to the fact that

visitation was in the best interests of the children, and that
visitation was occurring.
Boyd and Beverly's dissatisfaction over the visitation was
not with the time or the frequency, as their past pattern of
involvement would show.

(They took frequent extended vacations

and prior to Kelly's death only had contact with the children
approximately once per month.)

Their dissatisfaction over the

visitation was caused by the fact that Janet would not allow them
to take any or all of the children at any time and to any place,
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without her knowledge of where they were going, what they were
doing, or when they would return.

Janet submits that this is not

a right that is granted to them under the statute, or which they
could reasonably expect to be granted them by this Court or any
other, because of the Constitutional nature of her right as a
parent.

It appears that the litigation here was intended to be

used as economic blackmail to strengthen Boyd and Beverly's hand
in the battle to have control and influence over the children.
There is little question but that Boyd and Beverly's financial
situation is much better than Janet's, who is trying to raise
five boys on the Social Security income she receives from Kelly's
death.
Counsel for Janet has attached an Affidavit for Attorney
Fees as Exhibit "C" to this Brief.

CONCLUSION
The stipulations of the parties disposed of the factual
issues in this case, thereby leaving only legal issues for
decision.

The Court's decision and findings adequately explain

the basis for its decision on the legal issue, constitutionality.
There is nothing to prohibit the Court from raising this issue
sua sponte.

Had the trial court ruled on the legal issues before

taking the parties' stipulations, there would have remained no
factual issues to be decided—Appellants would have come out with
no stipulation from Janet, and would currently be having no
visitation at all.

The determination of legal issues is
21

precisely the function of the trial court, which function it
properly fulfilled in this case.
Respectifully submitted this ' CJ

*
day of May, 1994.

Dianne R. Balma4.it
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) exact copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellees to Appellant's attorney, L. Brent
Hoggan, OLSON & HOGGAN, 88 West Center Street, P.O. Box 525,
Logan, Utah 84323-0525 this 18th day of May, 1994.

Dianne R. Balmam

ADDENDUM

€©p

Dianne R. Balmain - 6175
Attorney for Defendant
110 North 100 East
P.O. Box 543
Logan, Utah 84323-0543
Telephone: (801) 753-7400

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH
BOYD & BEVERLY CAMPBELL,

*
ORDER

Plaintiff,

*

vs.

*

JANET C. CAMPBELL,

*

Defendant.

Case No. 934-054

*

THIS MATTER came on for hearing before District Judge Gordon
J. Low in Logan, Cache County, Utah, on Defendant's Objection to
the Order on Order to Show Cause held March 18, 1993, continued
from May 18, 1993 and July 27, 1993 by stipulation of the parties.
By agreement of the parties, this Order will effect a final
resolution of Plaintiff's Verified Complaint, dated January 26,
1993.
The Plaintiffs were present in person and were represented by
their Attorneys, Olson & Hoggan, P.C., L. Brent Hoggan.
Defendant

was

present

in person

and was

represented

The

by her

Attorney, Dianne R. Balmain. Counsel for each of the parties made
proffers

of

testimony

and

statements

to the Court

of their

respective clients' positions, and the Court having talked with the
two older children that are the subject of this action, MARC
CAMPBELL and BRENNAN CAMPBELL privately in chambers, and having

examined the file and having heard the statements of counsel and
being fully advised in the premises, the Court hereby makes and
enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAN
1.

Some visitation of the children by the Plaintiffs will

be beneficial and in the best interests and well-being of the
children.
2.

A

Constitutional

and

fundamental

right

of

the

Defendant/Mother is impinged upon the statute, § 30-5-2.
3.

Parents have great discretion with regard to the parent-

child relationship.

In addition to a duty of support for their

children, parents have all legal responsibility for decisions
affecting their children.
only

relationship

given

The parent-child relationship is the
constitutional

consideration

in

our

society.
4.

The statute § 30-5-2 was not intended to provide a vested

right of visitation in grandparents.

The statute provides the

court with discretion to order visitation when and if appropriate.
5.

This litigation by the Plaintiffs has been detrimental

to the children, who have suffered and may continue to suffer.
6.

The grandparents have to defer to Defendant/Mother's

decisions in this relationship.

The fact that the father is

deceased does not change this.
7.

The parent-child relationship is the primary relationship

that should be enhanced.

Further, it is in the interest of public

2

policy to enhance this relationship by deferring to reasonable
decisions by the parent.
8.

The Defendant/Mother has stipulated that the following

is appropriate and reasonable visitation with the Plaintiffs, and
the court so finds.
ORDER
The Plaintiffs shall have the following visitation with their
grandchildren, Marc, Brennan, Wade, Lorrin, and Tannen Campbell:
1.

The Defendant will make a reasonable effort to inform the

Plaintiffs of all significant church, school and recreational
activities.

The Court realizes that this may not be possible in

every circumstance, and that it may not always be in the best
interests

of

the

children

for the mother

to

so

inform the

Plaintiffs.
a.

Visitation should not interfere with or override

these activities, unless the Defendant/Mother determines that it
is in the best interests of the children.
b.

The children's desires regarding the presence of

others at these activities and events should be considered.
2.

One (1) evening on the day before or after each child's

birthday from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. if the birthday occurs during
the school year, and until 8:30 p.m. if the birthday occurs when
school is not in session.
3.

One (1) day during the Christmas holidays.

4.

One-half (1/2) day during the Thanksgiving holiday.
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5.

The time and duration of the Campbell family reunion,

provided that the Defendant/Mother is also invited to attend.
6.

Once per month from 4:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m. with one

child of the Plaintiffs' choice for purposes of the development of
a one-on-one relationship with that child.
DONE in open Court the 17th day of September, and signed this
& I

day of-September, 1993.

S/GORDONJ.LOW
Gordon J. Low
District Court Judge
Approved as to form:

L. Brent Hoggan
OLSON & HOGGAN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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L. Brent Hoggan (#1512)
OLSON & HOGGAN, P. C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
88 West Center
P. 0. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84323-0525
Telephone: (801) 752-1551
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
BOYD CAMPBELL and BEVERLY
CAMPBELL,
Plaintiffs,

BOYD AND BEVERLY CAMPBELLS'
REQUESTED VISITATION SCHEDULE

vs.
JANET C. CAMPBELL,
Civil No. 934000054
Defendant.

it

s
,0

V

lc H O G G A N

P<

RNEYS AT LAW
VEST CENTER
O BOX 5 2 5
JTAH 8 4 3 2 3 0 5 2 5
1) 752 1551

)NTON OFFICE
3 EAST MAIN
O BOX 1 1 5
TON UTAH 8 4 3 3 7
1) 2 5 7 3 8 8 5

Boyd and Beverly Campbell (Campbells) request the following
visitation with their grandchildren, issue of Kelly and Janet
Campbells
/ 1 , One (1) twenty-seven (27) hour period every other week,
preferably from 6:00 p.m. Friday night to 9:00 p.m. on Saturday
night.
If the children have church, school or recreational
activities or music lessons during this time, Campbells will see
that the children involved attend all such activities.
2. One (1) evening on the day before or after each child's
birthday ip&& 4:00 p.m. to 8v*K) p.m. during the schoo^ year and
until 9^00 p.m. when school is not in session.
Father's Day from 9:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.
l
Three ^3) days during the Christmas holidays
One (1) day during the Thanksgiving holiday from 9:00 a.m
until9:00 p.m. l/? &&V\

1fa]& l>f

(&J- One
7.

The time ?md aurfati<pif of Campbells' family reunions
reu

8.

Once per month from 4:00, p.m. until 8:00 p.m. with one
child of Campbells' choice f6r purposes of a one-on-one
relationship with that child. '
In addition to the foregoing, Campbells would like the older
children to work at odd jobs provided by Boyd Campbell during the
summer for the purpose of assisting Janet in teaching the children
a strong work ethic and as a way of providing money to the children
earned through their own effort, for school, recreation and savings
purposes•
The Campbells also ask that they be given at least one (1)
week's notice of the dates each child will receive church
ordinances such as baptisms and priesthood ordinations and of the
children's participation in school, church and sporting type events!
and the right to attend any such events.
DATED this 17th day of September, 1993.

(W

Respectfully submitted,
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.

U^r~^

L. Brent Hoggan
Attorneys f o r P l a i n t

utf*

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I personally hand delivered an exact
copy of the foregoing Boy and Beverly Campbells' Requested
Visitation Schedule, to Defendant's Attorney, Dianne R. Balmain,
this 17th day of September, 1993.

(

JU^%&>fy*c«^

& HOGGAN, P.C.
DRNEYS AT LAW

L. Brent Hoggan

WEST CENTER
• O. BOX 525
UTAH 84323-0525
31) 752-1551
ONTON OFFICE
23 EAST MAIN
'.O. BOX 1 15
<<TON, UTAH 84337
01) 257-3885

I LBH/ct
I(Campbell.vis
'lN-31.30
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Dianne R. Balmanin - 6174
Attorney for Defendant
110 North 100 East
P.O. Box 543
Logan, Utah 84323-0543
Telephone: (801) 753-7400
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH
BOYD & BONNIE CAMPBELL,
Plaintiff,

*
*

vs.

*

JANET CAMPBELL,

*

Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH

AFFIDAVIT FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES

Case No.

*

:

ss
COUNTY OF CACHE:
Dianne R. Balmain, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes
and states as follows:
1.

That I am an attorney licensed to practice in the State

of Utah and have been retained by the above named Defendant to
represent her in this action.
2.

That during the course of my representation of the

Defendant in this action, the undersigned has rendered services as
set forth in Exhibit A, attached hereto and by this reference made
a part hereof, for and on behalf of the said Defendant.
3.

That the usual and customary rate of legal services of

the type rendered herein is $65.00 per hour and brings the total
for legal services rendered, based upon the outlined hours in
Exhibit A, to date of $1,586.00.

4.

That in connection with this matter, I have incurred

expenses as set forth in Exhibit B, attached hereto and by this
reference made a part hereof, in the amount of $28.65.
DATED this

\ j

d a v o f Ka

Y> 1994.

U^DXahne W/BalmaAr^ '^
Attorney for Defendant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
DIANNE KARTCHNER
/.- / r ^ c A NOmYPUBUC'STMEOFVTAH
tti i~.Zttf\A
no NORTH 100 EAST
LOGAN, UTAH 84321
COMM. EXP. NOV. 11,1997

*

I ,

/

"!

•J

\?

^l\_

day of May, 1994

< *\ n

Notary Public

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby give notice that I mailed a copy of the foregoing:
AFFIDAVIT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES and attached Exhibits A & B to the
below named individuals on the
day of May, 1994.
Brent Hoggan
HOGGAN & OLSON
88 West Center
P.O. Box 525
Logan, UT 84323-0525

1 1/IIM, I'.pni.i

'u I \

EXHIBIT "A"
Hours

Amount

12/14/93

Review Documents Received.

0.20

13.00

12/22/93

Review Rules of Appeal Procedure.

0.30

19.50

01/03/94

Call to Court Reporter.

0.10

6.50

01/05/94

Call from Client.

0.10

6.50

01/11/94

Call from Client.

0.10

6.50

01/18/94

Call from Client.

0.10

6.50

Letter to Attorney Hoggan.

0.10

6.50

01/26/94

Call from Janet.

0.10

6.50

01/31/94

Call from Client.

0.20

13.00

02/22/94

Call from Client regarding
Visitation.

0.10

6.50

Review Material Received
from Janet.

0.10

6.50

Review Material Received;
Letter to Client.

0.10

6.50

Review Material Received;
Call to Janet; Letter to
Attorny Hoggan.

0.20

13.00

05/11/94

Call from Client.

0.10

6.50

05/14/94

Draft Appellate Appeal Brief.

3.00

195.00

05/15/94

Research. Draft Appellate Brief.

3.50

227.50

05/16/94

Work on Brief.

3.50

227.50

05/17/94

Work on Brief.

4.00

260.00

05/18/94

Finish Brief, Prepare for Filing.

1.50

97.50

(Estimate - Prepare for Oral
Argument, Oral Argument, Travel)

7.00

455.00

1.70

$1,586.00

03/05/94
03/07/94
03/08/94

BALANCE DUE

EXHIBIT "B'
COSTS
01/25/94

To Toni Frye for Transcript of OSC
Hearing.
To Rodney M. Felshaw for Transcript of
Hearing.
BALANCE DUE

$12.00
16.65
$27.65

